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FOXES AND HEN HOUSES?: PERSONAL
TRADING BY MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS
EDWARD B. ROCK*

INTRODUCTION

America's money is managed by professionals. 1 In this "fourth stage of
capitalism," 2 ensuring that those who manage our money do so in our
interests becomes the critical question. This Article examines that question
by focusing on the regulation of the personal trading activities of the
managers of tomorrow's dominant institutional investor, mutual funds.
Institutional investors are a varied group-public and private pension
funds, life insurance companies, commercial bank trust departments,
charitable trusts and mutual funds. An unanticipated consequence of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act's ("ERISA") full funding
requirement, 3 only now becoming clear, is that mutual funds are and will
continue growing at the expense of traditional pension funds. 4 ERISA's
requirement that pension liabilities be fully funded 5 has had the effect of
driving money away from traditional defined benefit pension plans 6

* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.S. Yale College ( !977), B.A.
Oxford University (1980); J.D. University of Pennsylvania (1983). I am grateful for helpful comments
from Thomas Harman, Jonathan Macey, Eric Orts, Menahem Spiegel, William Tyson, Michael Wac
hter, and participants in workshops at the University of Haifa Law Faculty and the Securities Author
ity of the State of Israel.
!. The largest money management firm, Fidelity, now manages over $275 billion in assets.
America's Top 300 Money Managers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1994, at !!3.
2. ROBERT C. CLARK, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treaties, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981) (reviewing TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS (!978) and HARVEY E. BINES, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (!978)).
3. ERISA§§ 301-06, 29 U.S.C. §§ !08!-86 (1994).
4. While a substantial amount of work has been done on the regulation of money managers, see
generally TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS (!978), the most recent
discussions of institutional investors have focused largely on pension funds . See, e.g., Bernard Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Premise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1277 ( 1991 ); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 ( 1991 ).
5. ERISA §§ 301-06, 29 U.S. C. §§ I 08!-86 (!994 ).
6. A defined benefit pension plan is one where the employing firm promises an employee a
certain pension (usually a percentage of terminal salary) upon retirement. The investment risk in such
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towards defined contribution plans. 7 Almost all of this defined contribution
plan money flows into mutual funds, explaining the large growth in mutual
fund investing. According to one recent estimate, twenty-seven percent of
all U.S. households-almost 40 million people-have more than $2 trillion
invested in mutual funds. 8
Now, against this background, come revelations of questionable behavior
by mutual fund managers. Patricia Ostrander, a portfolio manager for
Fidelity, was convicted of accepting an invitation to acquire valuable
warrants from Drexel Burnham Lambert, after causing her fund to buy
Drexel junk bonds. 9 John Kaweske, a successful and high profile money
manager at the Invesco fund group, was fired for failing to report his
personal trades to the mutual fund company, 10 and has now been charged
by the SEC with misusing his professional position to benefit himself and
others close to him. 11 Most recently, John Wallace, a top Oppenheimer
fund manager, was fined $20,000 for failing to report thirteen personal
trades. 12
In the wake of Kaweske's firing, it appeared that personal trading by
fund managers was widespread. Some claimed that "[b Jetter managers can
earn as much trading for themselves as they are paid by the company to
manage other people's money." 13 And these managers are already well
paid. 14
Personal trading by fund managers became, for a while at least, the issue

a plan is borne by the empl oying firm.
7. A defined contribution plan is one where the employing firm's commitment is limited to a
defined contribution. In thi s type of plan, which is fully fund ed ab initio, the emp loyee bears the
investment risk.
8. Patrick Harveson, Fund Managers Face Private Trading Curbs: Protecting U.S. Investors, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at 6.
9. Ronald Sullivan, Fund Manager Convicted of Taking Milken Bribes, N.Y. TIM ES, July 29,
1992, at Dl.
!0. See Sara Calian, Kaweske Denies Misusing Position as Fund Manager, WALL ST. J., May 18,
1995, at Cl3.
ll. SEC v. Kaweske, No. 14399, 1995 SEC LEXIS 330, at* l (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 1995); see also
Form er lnvesco Fund Manager Charged in Fraud Scheme, SEC Announces, 27 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
249 (F eb. l 0, 1995).
12. Robert McGough & Sara Calian, Oppenheimer Management Fund's Head Js Fin ed by SEC
for Personal Trades, WALL ST. J., Mar. l, !995, at A6.
13. Brett D. Fromson, Fund Managers' Own Trades Termed a Potential Conflict; Bigges t Mutual
Fund Firm Tightens Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. II , 1994, at A l.
!4. At Fidelity, a manager of a fund with $! billion in ass ets is said to earn between $600,000 and
$2.5 million in sa lary and bonuses. From son, supra note 13 , at A l .
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of the day. 15 In a letter to the SEC, Congress expressed its concern that
personal trading presented a serious problem. 16 In response, the SEC
opened an investigation, requested information on the private trading of
thirty mutual funds, and eventually issued a report addressing the
problem. 17 The Investment Company Institute (the "ICI"), the mutual fund
trade group, responded to the furor by forming a blue ribbon advisory
group that issued its own report and made recommendations in advance of
the SEC report. 18 The chief concern, said many, was the protection of
investors and the protection of the integrity of the mutual fund market. 19
Investors will cease to buy mutual funds, some worried, unless they are
reassured that the market is fair-and private trading by fund managers
undermines that perception.
The controversy over private trading by money managers, which is
important in its own right, provides the perfect context for examining the
larger set of issues relating to the regulation of money managers. Private
trading by fund managers and the public outcry following revelations of
impropriety are typical of a host of tempests that will arise in the future,
and therefore demand close scrutiny now.
In this Article, I examine the regulation of personal trading by money

15. See, e.g. , Ronald Campbell, Portfolio Pirates Pillage Mutual Funds, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 4,
1994, at Cl; Susan Antilla, Money Managers Who Cross the Line, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at Cl3.
16. Letter from Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Rep., to Arthur J. Levitt, Jr., Chairman, SEC (Jan.
II, 1994), cited in INVESTMENT Co. INST. , REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONA L INVESTING
2-3 (May 9, 1994) (hereinafter ICI REPORT].
17. Letter from Arthur J. Levitt, Jr., Chairman, SEC, to Edward J. Markey, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House
of Rep. (Feb. 9, 1994), cited in ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at 2-3. See also, Albert B. Crenshaw, SEC
Looks at Fund Managers; Inquiry is Focusing on Personal Trading, WASH. POST, Feb. II, 1994, at E I;
DIVISION OF !NV. MANAGEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PERSONAL INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES OF
INV ESTMENT COMPANY PERSONNE L: DIVISION OF INV ESTMENT MANAGEMENT (Sept. 1994) (hereinafter
SEC REPORT].
18. ICI REPORT, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g, Steve Bailey & Aaron Zitner, Mutual Fund Managers Come Under Scrutiny, B.
GLOBE, Jan. 16, 1994, at AI (quoting J. Carter Beese, Jr., an SEC commissioner, saying that the real
concern is not the violation, but the deterioration of trust which may cause th e public to lose confidence
in the industry as a whole). See infra note I 06 and accompanying text. See also Stan Hinden, Proposed
Personal Trading Limits Have Funds and Managers on Edge, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1994, at F3
(reporting SEC Commissioner Richard Y. Roberts' belief that a ban on personal trading may help
preserve the trust and confidence which is critical to the success of mutual funds); Tom Petruno, Hard
Questions for Fund Industry , CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 18, 1994, at 48 (suggesting that the small investor
needs to feel confident that mutual fund managers differ from the "market crooks" of the 1980's and
that fund managers will provide a "square deal") .
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managers as a vehicle for better understanding the bases and strategies for
regulating money managers in general. In Part I, after briefly describing the
organizational and regulatory frameworks of the mutual fund industry, I
describe the regulations governing personal trading by money managers. In
Part II, I describe the similarities and differences in the "codes of ethics"
adopted by firms to regulate personal trading. In Part III, I examine the
private incentives facing both fund managers and their employers, as well
as the potential harm facing investors. I then consider the kind of regulation
that would be appropriate in light of the nature of the potential harm. In
Part IV, I analyze the ICI Advisory Committee's recommendations, and
then tum to the SEC's more modest proposals in Part V.
I.

A.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A Brief Account of the Structure of Mutual Funds

Mutual funds have a distinctive organizational form that differs from
most other corporations. Mutual funds, or, in the terms used in the relevant
statutes, "investment companies," are companies that invest in securities. 20
Typically, Fund X is a corporation organized by Investment Adviser Firm
Y which manages Fund X for a fee that is usually a percentage of assets
under management. Having organized Fund X, Adviser Y enters into a
management contract with X, selling shares of X to the public-sometimes
directly, sometimes through brokers. Mutual fund investors are thus
shareholders of Fund X who depend on the performance of Adviser Y for
their returns. Often, Adviser Y organizes a variety of funds and distributes
their shares through a common, wholly-owned distributor. In such cases,
the groups of funds are referred to as "mutual fund complexes." 21 All of
the best known names in the mutual fund industry are fund complexes:
Fidelity Investments, Vanguard, Oppenheimer, and T. Rowe Price, among
others.
Because of the conflict of interest between Adviser Y and the shareholders of Fund X, the Investment Company Act ("ICA") 22 mandates a
number of governance devices. First, at least forty percent of the directors

20. Investment Company Act§ 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1988) [hereinafter ICA).
21. See, e.g., Donald W. Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 205,
206-34 ( 1970).
22. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. I 03-465 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-l to 80a-64 ( 1994)) [hereinafter ICA).
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(or trustees) of an investment company must be disinterested. 23 Second,
the advisory contracts between Fund X and Adviser Y must be in writing
and approved by a vote of a majority of outstanding shares and by a
majority of the disinterested directors of Fund X. 24
How Adviser Y provides its investment advice to Fund X varies. In some
cases, such as the Vanguard Group or the Templeton Funds, Y will hire
outside investment advisory firms to manage a portion of the assets and
scrutinize the outside advisers' performance.25 As such, Vanguard and
Templeton are, to a large degree, "managers of managers." 26 In other
cases, such as Fidelity Investments, Y will hire its own securities analysts
and traders to pick securities for Fund Y.
B.

The Legal Restrictions on Personal Trading by Fund Managers

The most distinctive feature of the regulation of fund managers and other
"access persons" 27 is the narrow range of mandatory regulation combined

23. ICA § lO(a), 15 U .S.C. § 80a-lO(a). If an investm ent company has a regular broker or a
principal underwriter on its board, a majority of the directors must be independent of the broker or
underwriter. Jd. In its recent study, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF C ENTURY OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY REGULATION , the SEC's Division of Investment Management has proposed that the ICA be
amended to require a majority of independent directors on all investment company boards and that
independent director vacancies be filled by the remaining independent directors. DIVISION OF !NV.
MANAGEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION xxix, 251-90 (1992) (hereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS].
24. ICA § 15, 15 U.S. C. § 80a-15 (1994). The Division oflnvestment Management has proposed
that the ICA be amended to give independent directors the authority to terminate advi so ry contracts.
PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 23 , at xxix, 268-69.
25. Vanguard Group Shujjles Management of Funds in a Bid to Improve Returns, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 22, 1994, at B 12 (noting the growing trend at Vanguard to contract out management of its funds
to unaffiliated money managers which allows Vanguard to replace managers or managem ent firms more
easily) [hereinafter Vanguard Shujjles Management].
26. !d.
27. While th e public controversy has focused on personal trading by "fund managers," the use of
that term is somewhat inappropriate. The term "fund manager" is generally used to refer to the
individual who has ultimate responsibility for selecting the securities for a given fund, e.g., John
Kawe ske.
The ICA and, more specifically, rule 17j-l is directed to a larger group o f "access persons." 17
C.F.R. § 270.17-1 (1995). "With respect to a regi stered investment company or an investment adviser,"
rule l7j-l (e)( l) defines "access persons" to include "any director, officer, general partner, or advisory
pers on, as defined in this section, of such investment company or investment adviser." 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.17j-l(e)(l).
According to rule l7j-l ( e )(2)(i), the term "advisory person o f a registered investment company or
an investment advisor thereof' refers, in pertinent part, to
[a]ny employee of such company or investment adviser (or of any company in a control
rel ationship to such investment company or investment adviser) who, in connection with hi s
regular functions or duties, makes, participates in, or obtains information, regarding the

__j
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with the requirement that fund managers' employers-the investment
advisers-explicitly adopt and enforce a code of ethics. As I describe in
this section, aside from securities regulations of general application, such
as the general prohibition on insider trading under section 1O(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193428 and rule 1Ob-5 29 promulgated thereunder, there are few mandatory restrictions on personal trading by fund
managers.

1. General Regulations
Fund managers, like others, are subject to the prohibitions on insider
trading that have developed under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Accordingly, a fund manager who trades on material nonpublic information from a
corporate insider (i.e., a "tip") violates section 1O(b) and rule 1Ob-5 if the
insider breached his or her fiduciary duty to the issuer in disclosing the
information and the fund manager knows or should know that there has
been a breach. 30 Similarly, a fund manager who purchases shares for his
or her own account shortly before recommending that security for longterm investment is liable under section 1O(b) and rule 1Ob-5 if he or she
then sells the personally-held shares at a profit during a rise in the market
price following the recommendation.3 1
In addition, the SEC has consistently viewed "front running" as a trading
abuse. The SEC defines front running as "trading a stock, option, or future
while in possession of non-public information regarding an imminent block
transaction that is likely to affect the price of the stock, option, or

purchase or sale of a security by a registered investment company, or whose functions relate
to the making of any recommendations with respect to such purchases or sales.
17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-l (e)(2)(i).
Rule 17j-l(c)( l) extends the filing req uiremen ts of 17j- l to transactions involving any security in
which the access person has "any direct or indirect beneficial ownership." 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c)(l).
This language is broad enough to include accounts held by immediate fam ily members. Consequently,
many investment companies regard all employees and their immediate family members as access
perso ns and require them to file quarterly reports under rule 17j-1. See ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at
II.
For the purpose of thi s article, I will use the terms fimd manager and access p erson more or less
interchangeably, except when a more precise usage is required.
28. Securities Exchange Act§ IO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
30. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 ( 1983). Thi s is commonly known as "tippee li ab ility."
3 1. SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304, 1310-13 (E.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th C ir.
1985). This practice is known as "scalping."

...........................................
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future." 32 Although some front running could be viewed as a violation of
section 10(b) or rule 10b-5, as discussed below, it could also constitute a
violation of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. 33 However, front
running has largely been handled through stock exchange rules 34 and
investment adviser's ethics codes rather than federal regulations.
2. The Investment Company Act

In addition to general regulations, personal trading by fund managers is
regulated under section 17 of the Investment Company Act. 35 Section 17
regulates transactions by the fund, 36 and contains two provisions of direct
relevance to personal trading. First, section 17(e) makes it unlawful for any
fund manager, while acting as an agent for the fund, "to accept from any
source any compensation (other than a regular salary or wages from such
registered company) for the purchase or sale of any property to or for such
registered company. " 37 In other words, section 17 (e)( 1) makes illegal the
acceptance of any benefit- such as privileged access to an attractive
investment opportunity or finder's fees-in exchange for investing assets
of the fund. Thus, a mutual fund manager who purchased for her own
account valuable warrants made available by Drexel Burnham Lambert in
exchange for purchasing junk bonds for her fund violated section 17(e). 38

32 . Memorandum from the Division of Market Regu lation of th e SEC Accompanying Letter from
DavidS. Ruder, SEC chairman, to Congressmen John D. Dingell and Edward J. Markey, 11-12 (May
13 , 1988) (citation omitted), quoted in Lewi s D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Market

Manipulations: An Examination and Analysis of Domination and Control. Frontrunning. and Parking,
55 ALB. L. REv. 293 ( 1991 ).
33. /d. Although it has largely been assumed that front running violates§ IO(b), rule !Ob-5, and
§ 206 of the Investment Adviser's Act, see, e.g. , ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at 6 n.16, there is little
case authority on point. The SEC has been ambiguous on whether rule I Ob-5 prohibits front running.
See generally, Mahlon M. Frankhauser, lntermarket Fron t Running: Background and Developments,
in BROKER DEALER INSTITUTE 1988, at 697 (PL! Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 621 ,
1988); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 32, at 313-37.
34. The New York Stock Exchange and Chicago Board Option Exchange both promu lgated rules
against front running during the late 1980s. For a discussion of these interpretation s, see Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 32, at 313-3 7. Fund managers fall within the ICA definition of"affiliated person"
because they are employees of an investm ent adviser who, itself, is an affi liated person.
35. ICA § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (I 994).
36. See, e.g. , ICA § 17(a)-(d) (mandating that fund securities be held by a custodi an); (f) (requiring
the bonding of officers and employees); (h)-(i) (prohibiting exc ulpatory provisions). 15 U.S.C. § 80a17(a)-(d), (f), (h), (i) (1994).
37. ICA § 17(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a- 17(e) .
38. United States v. Ostrander, 999 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Investors Research Corp. v.
SEC , 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 19 80); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98 (2d C ir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1014 (1972); United States v. Milken 759 F. Supp. 109 (S .D.N.Y. 1990); SEC v. Embry , No.
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Similarly, a mutual fund manager whose son received commissions from
an issuer based on the fund's purchase of that issuer's securities would
violate the Act as well. 39
Second, section 17(j), adopted in 1970, provides a general grant of
authority to the SEC to impose anti-fraud standards on fund managers. 40
This section evolved as "a response to the widely recognized need for the
development of adequate restraint on the trading of investment company
insiders in the companies' portfolio securities." 41 It permits the SEC to
impose rules of restraint directly or to require investment companies and
investment advisers to adopt codes of ethics which establish reasonable
standards to prevent individual trading.42
In 1980, the SEC promulgated rule 17j-l, which does several things. 43
First, rule 17j-l (a) makes it unlawful for fund managers, among others, to
engage in any fraudulent or deceptive practices against the investment
company in connection with the purchase or sale of securities by or for the
investment company. 44 Therefore, actions such as front running, accepting
bribes and kickbacks, and scalping all violate rule 17j-l.
Over and above this general anti-fraud provision, rule 17j -1 also
mandates that investment companies and investment advisers adopt a
written code of ethics. Similar in scope to section 17(j), rule 17j-l attempts
to prevent any access person from engaging in any fraudulent or deceptive
activity. 45 In addition, the investment company and its investment advisers

13777, 1993 WL 342039 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1993).
39. SEC v. Kaweske, No. 14399, 1995 SEC Lex is 330, at *I (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 1995).
40. ICA § 17U) provides in re levant part:
It shall be unlawful for any affiliated pe rso n of ... a registered investment company or any
afftliated person of an investment adviser of ... a registered investment company, to engage
in any act, practice, or course of business in connection wi th the purchase or sale, directly or
indirec tly, by such perso n of any security held or to be acquired by such registered in vestment
company in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Co mmission may adopt to
define, and prescribe means reasonably necessary to prevent, such acts, practices, or courses
of business as are fraudulent, deceptiv e or manipulative.
ICA § 17U), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17U) (1994).
41. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1969). See also, H.R. REP. No. 1382, 9lst Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1970).
42. ICA § 17U), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17U) (1994).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1 (1995).
44. !d.
45. Rule 17j-l provides that investment companies and, investment advisers,
sha ll adopt a written code of ethics containing provisions reasonably necessary to prevent its
acce ss persons [including fund managers ] from engaging in any act, practice, or course of
business prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section and shall use reasonable dili gence, and
institute procedures reasonably necessary, to preve nt violations of such code.
17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(b)(1) .
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must "use reasonable diligence, and institute procedures reasonably
necessary, to prevent violations of [the ethical] code." 46 Finally, rule 17jl (c) mandates that access persons report trades to their funds. 47
In sum, aside from the general prohibition of the perpetration of fraud
on investment companies, including a prohibition on bribes and kickbacks,
rule 17j-1 mandates that investment advisers adopt and enforce explicit
codes of ethics. The contents of those codes are left largely to the
individual firms. This deference to the investment companies and
investment advisers was hardly accidental. In the release accompanying rule
l7j-l, the SEC explained:
[T]he variety of employment and institutional arrangements utilized by
different investment companies renders impracticable a rule designed to cover
all conceivable possibilities. 48

This perceived impracticality led the SEC to adopt a policy which lets
"individual entities take fully into account their own unique circumstances
in designing their codes of ethics prescribing standards of conduct which
effectuate the purposes of the Rule." 49 The Commission felt the introduction and tailoring of these ethical restraints should be left with the directors
of the investment company because they can best assess what is needed. 5°
While leaving the contents of the codes to the individual firms, the SEC
indicated that it expected firms to address certain potentially abusive
activities in their codes.5 1 The SEC identified a number of situations as
raising particular concerns. Specifically, it included the conflicts of interest
that arise when access persons engage in personal transactions involving
securities that the investment company has acquired, will acquire or is
considering acquiring. 52

3. The Investment Advisers Act
The Investment Advisers Act53 likewise applies to personal trading by

46. !d.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c).
48. Prevention of Certain Unlawful Activities with Respect to Registered In vestment Companies,
Exchange Act Release No. 11,421, 1980 WL 25707, at *2 (October 31, 1980).
49. !d. at *4.
50. !d. at *2.
51. !d.
52. !d.
53. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 103-31 7 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 ( 1994)) [hereinafter IAA].
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fund managers. Section 204A, added in the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Act of 1988/ 4 requires each investment adviser to "establish,
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed
. . . to prevent the misuse in violation of this Act or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, or the rules or regulations thereunder, of material,
nonpublic information by such investment adviser or any person associated
with such investment adviser." 55 As a complement to section 204A,
Congress added section 21 A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at the
same time. 56 Section 21A provides a clearer standard making an investment adviser liable for knowingly or recklessly failing to prevent trading
on material nonpublic information by one of its fund managers. 57
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act adds additional restraints
prohibiting fraudulent or manipulative transactions by investment
advisers .58 Thus, a fund manager who purchases shares for his or her own
account shortly before recommending that security for long term investment, and sells the shares at a profit upon the rise in the market price
following the recommendation (i.e., scalping), violates section 206, in
addition to rule 17j-l, section lO(b) and rule 10b-5. 59 Front running also
falls within the prohibitions of section 206. 60 Similarly, a fund manager
who directly or indirectly receives secret commissions from an issuer for
purchasing securities on behalf of the fund is in violation. 61
In combination, the various regulations result in the mandatory
prohibition of trading on material nonpublic information, bribes and
kickbacks, and trading in advance of the fund (i.e., front running and
scalping). Beyond these core offenses, however, the effect of ICA section
17(j) and rule 17j-l is to require what is, in essence, private ordering by
explicit contractual terms controlling the conflicts of interest inherent in

54. Pub. L. No. I 00-704, I 02 Stat. 4677 ( 1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
55. IAA § 204A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a ( 1994).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l.
57. !d.
58. !AA § 206 pro vides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser . . . (4) to engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. Th e commission shall, for
the purposes of this paragraph ( 4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, suc h acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
IAA § 206(4), 15 U.S.C. § SOb-6(4) (1994).
59. SEC v. Capital Gains Re search Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
60. See, ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at 6 n.6.
6 1. SEC v. Kaweske, No. 14399, 1995 SEC LEXIS 330, at* l (D. Co lo. Feb. 6, 1995) .
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personal trading by fund managers. In contrast to insider trading regulations, where the same rules apply across the board, the statutory scheme
governing personal trading by fund managers anticipates and indeed
encourages different approaches by different firms, depending on their
individual needs. Although explicitly acknowledging the conflicts of
interest posed by personal trading by fund managers, the SEC, in 1980, did
not ban such trading outright. It is to these codes that I now tum .
II.

THE ETHICS CODES: AN OVERVIEW

In response to the controversy over personal trading by fund managers,
the ICI surveyed current ethics codes of its members. Ninety-six investment
company complexes, associated with over 2,150 mutual funds, and
representing nearly ninety percent of mutual fund assets, responded .62 The
survey indicated both commonality and diversity, with greater uniformity
in enforcement procedures than in substantive content. 63
Funds have largely adopted the same enforcement technology. All ninetysix fund complexes mandate some type of preclearance, i.e. notification and
approval before trading, for personal securities transactions. 64 Of the
ninety-six funds, sixty-two mandated preclearance for all personal securities
transactions, with defined exceptions, while thirty-four mandated
preclearance for certain defined transactions. 65 This uniformity is striking
insofar as preclearance is not required under rule 17j-l . While not required,
preclearance is nevertheless critical to detecting, preventing and discouraging front running and scalping.
Similarly, all ninety-six funds imposed reporting requirements on access
persons (as required under rule 17j-l), but varied somewhat on the form
and frequency of reporting. 66 As an additional check on personal trading
activity, twenty-seven fund complexes require the submission of monthly
brokerage statements; twenty-two require brokerage confirmations; and ten
go so far as to require employees to trade through the firm. 67
There was substantially greater diversity on the substantive provisions of
the codes. Of the ninety-six complexes surveyed, only twenty-five explicitly

62. See ICI REPORT, supra note 16, app. II , at 3.
63 . /d.
64. !d.
65. !d.
66. Seventy-eight require reporting on a ·quarterly basis, thirtee n monthl y, and fiv e on a
transac tional basis. /d.
67. !d. app. II, at 5.

~-
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restricted initial public offering ("IPO") purchases and only seven funds
explicitly restricted private placement purchases. 68 Additionally, sixty-three
of the ninety-six funds restricted trading by specified personnel concurrent
with the trading of their funds, imposing a range of time restrictions upon
their personal activity before and after any trade by the fund. 69 Fifteen of
ninety-six funds expressly discouraged or prohibited short term trading,
with two complexes requiring securities to be held for thirty days, one for
sixty days and one for ninety-one days. 70 Thirty-seven complexes had
restrictions on the receipt of gifts, with eighteen prohibiting the receipt of
gifts, eight permitting gifts of less than fifty dollars annually, and seven of
less than $100 annually. 71 Ten complexes explicitly restricted service as
a director or trustee on the board of another company. 72
The SEC's survey of thirty investment companies found similar
patterns. 73 Twenty-one prohibited access personnel from purchasing or
selling any security that he or she knows is being considered for purchase
or sale, or are being purchased or sold, by the fund. 74 Sixteen fund groups
imposed a black out period ranging from one to thirty days. 75 Five fund
groups were found to prohibit or restrict purchases of IPOs; nine other
groups prohibited or restricted purchases of "hot issue" IPOs. 76 Five
groups restricted purchases of private placements and four fund groups
banned short term trading. 77
Regarding enforcement methodology, nineteen fund groups required preclearance of all personal trades, while four fund groups had more limited
preclearance requirements. 78 Eighteen fund groups required employees to
report securities transactions contemporaneously, a more stringent
requirement than the quarterly reporting required under rule 17j-1. 79 Only
one fund group required new employees to disclose securities holdings
upon beginning employment. 80

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

!d.
!Cl REPORT, supra note I 6, app. ll, at 5.
!d.
!d.
!d.
See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, exhibit B.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
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Beyond these aggregate patterns, it is difficult to determine the details of
specific firms' ethics codes. By and large, firms refuse to provide copies
of their ethics codes, presumably for two reasons. First, they may not want
to be cross-examined about them or required to explain the inevitable
violations by personnel. Second, and more speculatively, to the extent that
controlling conflicts of interest is a management problem, they may not
want to share their solutions with their competitors.
Published reports provide some details of firms' ethical codes. At one
extreme is Berger Associates, a $2 billion fund complex, which prohibits
personal trading entirely. 8 1 By contrast, Fidelity Investments, the largest
fund complex, permits personal trading, but only under circumscribed
conditions. 82 According to descriptions of Fidelity's procedures, the rules
include the following:

*

Portfolio managers must clear all equity investments in personal accounts
through Fidelity's head of trading prior to making a transaction. In
determining whether to approve the trade, the head of trading looks at all
activity of Fidelity funds with a view to a conflict of interest. 83
* Portfolio managers aren't allowed to buy a security for their own accounts
for five days before or after they bought or sold it for their fund.
Managers' green light to buy a stock lasts only one day. 84
* All personal investments are reported monthly and reviewed by the
compliance staff. They also are reviewed by independent auditors
semiannually. 85
* Fidelity ' s compliance staff of sixty conducts ongoing training and
education courses for Fidelity's 300 investment professionals. Each year,
portfolio managers must sign a revised version of the company's code of
ethics. 86
* If a fund manager has an investable idea, he or she must inform all the
other managers before buying any shares for his or her personal account,
and must then wait a week before buying the stock. 87
* Trading restrictions apply to any stock with a market capitalization, or total

8 1.
9, 1994,
82.
Must Be
83.
4, 1994,
84.
85.
86.
87.

Jd. at 26 n.77. See also, B.J. Phillips, Mutual Funds. Mutu al Conflicts, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar.
at Cl.
Doug Rogers, Some Managers Forswear Personal Trading: Berger 's Linafelter Says Fund
Adviser's Only Priority, IN VESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Mar. 8, 1994, at 29.
Doug Rogers, Funds Keep Tight Rein On Managers' Trading , INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Mar.
at 5.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Fromson, supra note 13, at A I.
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market value, above forty million dollars.88
Fidelity analysts, who provide research to fund managers, must wait at
least five days after issuing a recommendation before trading the stock. 89
A prohibition against portfolio managers calling companies to get
information unless they include the Fidelity research analyst who covers
the company, or tell the analyst the substance of the conversation, so that
the analyst can alert other managers who might want to buy the stock for
their funds. 90

T. Rowe Price, another large fund group, follows a similar approach.
Portfolio managers are required to report personal transactions within ten
days .91 In addition, whenever a new stock enters aT. Rowe fund, the firm
looks back to see if any T. Rowe manager bought it in the past twelve
months. 92
III.

PERSONAL TRADING BY FUND MANAGERS: CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST AND MANDATORY RULES

What, then, are the conflicts of interests between the funds and the fund
managers with respect to personal trading, and why should the law worry
about these conflicts? In this section, I will consider the incentives facing
fund managers, the incentives facing their employers, the investment
advisers, and the interests of the fund investors.
A.

Fund Managers ' Incentives

Consider, first, the conflicting incentives facing fund managers. Fund
managers are agents, typically ofthe fund's investment adviser, and present
a classic agency problem. The core conflict of interest is that fund
managers receive 100% of the net profits made on personal trading but
only indirect benefits from profits on trades by the fund they advise.
Benefits may come in a variety of forms. First, whether or not fund
managers keep their jobs or get better jobs depends, in large measure, on
their performance. Second, fund managers ' compensation may be tied to
their performance. Third, fund managers may have their own money
invested in their funds.
The opportunities for abuse also arise in a number of ways. First, fund

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Rogers, supra note 83, at 5.
!d.
Fromson, supra note 13, at A 1.
Rogers, supra note 83, at 5.
!d.

______.______________________________
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managers have a financial incentive to front run. For example, a manager
who buys or sells stock in advance of a purchase or sale by the fund that
the manager believes will move the stock price. Variants of this practice are
possible. Thus, a fund manager might purchase or sell a security in advance
of the purchase or sale of the security by a different fund in the same fund
complex. Similarly, a fund manager might purchase a security and then
casually recommend the security to managers of other funds in the same
complex, hoping that they will purchase it for their funds and move the
pnce.
A second type of conflict involves the diversion of fund investment
opportunities and conversion of fund property. Specifically, a fund manager
who, in the course of working for the fund, comes across a particularly
attractive stock will have an incentive to purchase that stock for a personal
account. However, to avoid front running, the fund manager may refuse to
purchase it for the fund, or instead purchase it substantially later, after the
black out period ends. 93 Similarly, a fund manager who executes trades
without listing the fund for which it was being made, and then later
allocates the profitable trades to an account benefiting employees while
allocating unprofitable trades to the funds, diverts investment opportunities. 94
A third type of conflict of interest arises when personal trading leads a
fund manager to shirk, to work less on picking stocks for the fund he or
she manages. As John Neff, long time head of Vanguard's Windsor Fund,
put it, "You are spending an awful lot of your waking hours managing your
own portfolio when you should be looking after the fund. The fund must
come first. You should not be managing your own money actively while
you are managing other people's money actively." 95 Andrew Cox, a
trustee of the Montgomery Funds, argues that personal trading by fund
managers means: "They're spending time analyzing stocks that aren't

93 . The blackout period is the period of time during which the SEC scrutinizes any trades made
by an insider.
94. See, e.g., Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 203(f) and 203(k) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Sections 9(b) and 9(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, No. 3-8712, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1312, at *I (June
6, 1995) (imposing remedial sanctions on a former portfolio manager who delayed reporting accounts
to gain a more favorable price); Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 203(e)(5) and 203(k)
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Findings and Order Imposing Remedial Sanctions, No. 38207, 1993 SEC LEXIS 3426, at *I (Oct. 20, 1993) (holding liable an investment company for failing
to stop a portfolio manager from delaying designating accounts).
95. Fromson, supra note 13, at AI.
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benefiting the fund. They can all say, 'I do it at home after my kids are in
bed,' but, well, give me a break." 96 This potential for shirking is, of
course, a generic problem, applying equally to personal trading by
corporate managers and academics.

B.

The Benefits of Personal Trading

Given these risks, why might rational fund advisers seek to regulate
personal trading rather than banning it outright? From the fund adviser's
perspective, several answers are given. First, fund advisers argue that
permitting personal trading, with limitations, is necessary to attract and
retain the right sort of fund manager. Top managers often like to trade for
their personal accounts . William Hayes, managing director and head of the
equities group at Fidelity explained: "[W]e're looking for market animals,
people who are players. We look for money makers, people who know
what the game is all about." 97 Roy Adams, a mutual fund lawyer, added:
"I think it's necessary to think about what the fund manager is. By and
large, these are people who live, breathe and die the stock market. This is
their passion. Many of them started trading stocks at 12."98
Had Fidelity told Peter Lynch, the fund manager credited with the
extraordinary success of Fidelity's Magellan fund, that he could not do any
personal trading, he might well have gone to work elsewhere. 99 In
contrast, hedge funds, bank common trust and investment funds, and
insurance companies are already less strictly regulated. 100 A Peter Lynch
could work for one of them and continue to manage money while trading.
A second explanation is that personal trading sharpens fund managers'
skills. 101 A former Fidelity manager said: "They want people to realize
this is not a game-it really matters. And when you lose your own money,

96. Susan Antilla, Wall Street; Fund Managers Testing the Rules, N.Y . TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, § 3,
at 15.
97. Bailey & Zinter, supra note 19, at AI.
98. CNN. Inside Business (CNN television broadcast Jan. 30, 1994).
99. Fromson, supra note 13, at AI.
100. For example, hedge funds (co!lective investment funds with fewer than 100 investors who, as
a result, fall outside the definition of"investment company" in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3{c)(l) (1944)), bank
commo n trust and collective investment funds, commodity pools, and insurance companies are all
subject to substantially less stringent regulation. For an overview of the different (and more lax)
regulations, see Summary of Standards Applicable to Other Managers of Pooled Investment Vehicles,
ICI REPORT, supra note 16, app. VI (prepared by Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobsen).
101. Fromson, supra note 13, at AI (quoting Robert Pozen, general counsel at Fidelity, as saying:
" We know that Peter Lynch did some personal trading and felt it sharpened his skills").
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it has an impact on you." 102
Third, firms can learn a lot about the behavior, taste and integrity of their
access personnel from their personal trading. How employees behave with
their own money may tell the firm a great deal about how they will behave
with other people's money. 103
Finally, because fund managers can make significant amounts from
personal trading, it could be costly for a firm to ban it. The firm would
have to cover at least a portion of the lost income or risk losing the best
managers.
In light of these potential benefits, many investment advisers have chosen
to control or limit personal trading rather than banning it. 104

C.

Mutual Fund Investors

What, aside from jealously, should trouble mutual fund investors about
the possibilities for abuse? The harm to investors can be divided into three
categories. First, to the extent that fund managers divert trading opportunities to their personal portfolios, shirk, cause the fund to pay higher prices
for a security, or cause the fund to purchase a security it would not
otherwise buy in order to front run, the fund's returns will be compromised,
directly harming investors.
Second, and independent of the effect on returns, personal trading abuses
may lead an investor to lose confidence in a particular fund. This forces the
investor to bear the costs of identifying a new fund, and then shifting his
or her investments. The transaction costs associated with shifting the
investment will vary depending on whether the fund is an open or closedend fund, and whether it is a load or no-load fund.
Third, trading abuses, as well as other ethical lapses by fund managers,
may lead investors to lose confidence in the integrity of the mutual fund
sector as a whole, leading them to shift their assets elsewhere. If this were
to occur, it would impose costs both on investors, who would have to find
another investment opportunity, as well as on society, to the extent that
mutual funds are an important and low cost source of investment capital.
It is this last concern that seems to lie behind much of the condemnation
of personal trading. J. Carter Beese, Jr., an SEC commissioner, articulated
this concern: "The issues go beyond whether a violation may have

102. Bailey & Zitner, supra note 19, at AI.
103. I owe this point to Amir Ziv, Columbia Business School.
104. See supra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
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occurred. The mutual fund industry has been built on trust. The public must
have confidence in those investing their money, or they might lose
confidence in the industry as a whole." 105
But the importance of public confidence does not, by itself, justify
regulatory intervention. One must first examine the incentives that the fund
managers' employers, the investment advisers, have to control it.

D.

Fund Advisers' Incentives and the Need for Regulatory Intervention

:Personal trading by fund managers is an activity that imposes costs but
may also create benefits. Before turning to the question of the appropriate
role for the SEC in regulating personal trading, the fund advisers' private
incentives must first be analyzed.
Consider the first type of harm posed by personal trading: impaired
investment performance. The fund manager's employer-the fund's
investment adviser or a subcontracting investment adviser-has substantial
incentives to maximize performance, and therefore a strong incentive to
control abusive behavior by the fund manager. Studies of mutual funds
consistently indicate a complex relationship between investment performance and asset flows. 106 Strong evidence indicates that investors direct
funds in response to new information about performance. Ippolito, for
example, finds "a clear underlying movement of investment monies in the
muh1al fund industry toward recent good performers and away from recent
poor performers over the period 1965-84." 107 Ippolito also found evidence
that recent performers continue to perform well, providing a rationale for
investment algorithms that favor recent performers. 108
While early studies suggested a linear relationship between performance
and asset flows, 109 more recent work indicates that the relationship is

105. Bailey & Zitner, supra note 19, at AI. See also Hinden, supra note 19; Petruno, supra note
19.
106. JUDITH CHEVALIER ET AL., RISK TAKING BY MUTUAL FUNDS AS A RESPONSE TO INCENTI VES
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5234, 1995); Richard A. Ippolito,
Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: A Study of Mutual Fund Pe1jormance 1965-84, 35
J.L. & EcoN . 45 (1992); A. Edward Spitz, Mutual Fund Pe1jormance and Cash Inflow, 2 APPLI ED
ECON. 141 ( 1970); Kevin V. Smith, Is Fund Growth Related to Fund Performance?, J. PORTFOLIO
Morvn. Spring 1978, at 49; J. Patel et a!., Investment Flows and Performance: Evidence from Mutual
Funds, Cross-Boarder Investments, and New Issues, (Harvard Univ. Working Paper 1990); Erik R. Sirri
& Peter Tufano, Buying and Selling Mutual Funds: Flows, Performance, Fees, and Services ( 1993)
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper, on file with author).
107. Ippolito, supra note 106, at 67.
108. !d. at 60-69.
109. Patel eta!. , supra note 106; Smith, supra note 106; Spitz, supra note 106.
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uneven and asymmetrical: More assets flow to superior performing funds
than flow away from poor performers. 110 Moreover, most of the asymmetry is driven by very large inflows of investment capital to the highest
ranked firms. 111 Outside of the top quintile, performance and asset flows are
weakly related. 112 Indeed, according to Sirri and Tufano, there is surprisingly little evidence of money flowing out of the poorest performers. 113
This strong asymmetry suggests that funds have an incentive to take on
excessive risk in order to become "stars." If the risk pays off and a firm
places in the top quintile, it will see large asset growth; however, if the risk
does not pay off and returns suffer, firms will face much smaller asset
outflows. 114 This effect may be particularly pronounced in fund complexes, where having a "star" fund may redound to the benefit of the complex
as a whole.
While the weakness and asymmetries in the relationship between
performance and asset flows create a potential for agency costs in the
mutual fund context, they do not undermine significantly the assumption
that funds will care about actions by access personnel that impair
performance. Indeed, a fund's desire to place in the top quintile should
make it especially vigilant in preventing trading by access persons which
diverts favorable investment opportunities.
In light of these correlations between investment performance and asset
flows (and the associated fees), funds, whether they manage money inhouse or contract it out, have strong incentives to control abusive behavior.
Consider, first, the Vanguard and Templeton approaches, in which the fund
adviser contracts out active equity management. 115 The supervising fund
adviser has access to the full range of highly sophisticated measurement
instruments to direct money to outside firms which perform well, and away
from funds that perform badly. 11 6 Indeed, one advantage of using outside
money managers, claims Vanguard, is that it is easier to change managers

II 0. Ippolito, supra note I 06, at 6 1-64; Sirri & Tufano, supra note l 06, at 13-24.
Ill. Sirri & Tufano, supra note l 06, at 3.
112. !d. at 14-15.
113. Id.
114. !d. at 35.
115. See Vanguard Shuffles Management, supra note 25, at 812.
116. While Vanguard 's CEO, John Bogle, may express his view that personal trading by fund
managers should be prohibited, what Vanguard cares about is the investment performance of the money
management firm s it retains. Ani se C. Wallace, Closed-End Fund Facing Challenge, N.Y. TIM ES, Dec.
15, 1987, at Dl 2.
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if performance lags. 11 7 Competition among money management firms to
attract capital will thus impose pressure on the firms to adopt whatever
approach to managing its employees' conflicts of interest is best for its
style of investing and for the kind of employees it attracts.
In this context, what is important is that there is no particular reason to
believe that the same approach to managing potential conflicts of interests
will be optimal for all firms. For example, one investment adviser may take
the view that hiring managers who live and breathe stocks, who want to
trade all the time and who cannot conceive of not trading for their own
accounts, will maximize returns. Another firm might take the view that
personal trading leads employees to shirk on firm work and that a ban on
personal trading will maximize returns by directing all energies into firm
business. If the first firm is right, Vanguard and others will send it more
money and it will receive higher management fees and prosper. If the
second firm is right, it will thrive for the same reasons. Indeed, both firms
may be right, each adopting an approach that suits its strategy and
employees.
This same set of incentives exists even when fund managers work
directly for the fund adviser. The only difference is that all functions now
take place within a single firm. Thus, Fidelity, unlike Vanguard, largely
manages its money in-house. 118 But, like Vanguard, Fidelity is driven to
maximize performance, and has incentives to adopt a policy on personal
trading that will do so. As before, there is no reason to believe that the
same policy will be optimal for all of its funds. One might, for example,
impose no limitations on personal trading by employees who manage an S
& P 500 index fund, while imposing significant limitations on managers
who manage a small capitalization growth fund . Or the complex might
worry that the S & P 500 index manager will pick up information over
lunch with the small cap growth fund manager and impose identical
limitations on both funds . Along the same lines, a small fund complex like
Berger Associates may have adopted its ban on personal trading as a
mechanism for self selection. Forcing managers to invest in the fund may
allow Berger to screen out managers with an insufficient appetite or
tolerance for risk. In each of these cases, the choice of what sort of policy
on personal trading is likely to maximize returns is quintessentially a
management decision. Therefore Fidelity, Vanguard, or Berger, will reap

117. See Vanguard ShujJ/es Managem ent, supra note 25, at 812 .
118. See, e.g., Jerry Ackerm an, Henning to Run Fidelity Fixed In come Group, BOSTON GLOBE, May
4, 1995, at 83.
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the benefits of a good solution and bear the cost of a bad solution, as
money flows in or out based on investment returns. By trying to maximize
funds under management, the fund adviser is well positioned to protect
investors from harm to performance caused by personal trading.
The pressure on fund advisors to maximize returns, then, provides
investors with substantial protection against trading practices that impair
performance. In this connection, the SEC has an important role to play in
ensuring that timely, accurate and comparable information on performance
is provided to the market. 11 9 As with other consumer products, "consumer
vigilance is more efficacious if the market has access to systematic and
comparable information across brands." 120 But, to the extent that the
personal trading controversy is about investment performance, the market's
responsiveness to mutual fund performance makes unnecessary broader
SEC involvement.
As discussed above, however, the controversy over personal trading is
not, solely or perhaps even centrally, a controversy over whether personal
trading interferes with maximizing investment performance. Rather, a core
concern seems to be that personal trading will lead investors to lose
confidence in mutual funds and consequently stop investing.
To the extent that investors care about characteristics of particular funds
other than risk and return-and therefore might incur the costs of switching
to a more ethical fund-fund advisers have incentives to respond. Thus, to
the extent that investors care about "social responsibility," fund advisers
have an incentive to establish and advertise funds that respond to these
concerns, such as the Calvert Social Investment Funds. 121 Alternatively,
if investors care about the potential ethical impropriety of personal trading,
funds likewise have an incentive to market themselves as funds that ban
personal trading. Whether such funds would attract investment would be a
direct test of investors' concern with personal trading.
E.

The Core Market Integrity Argument

The previous incentive responses, however, fail to appreciate fully the
concern with "market integrity." Investors worry about "integrity," even if
they have full information about past performance, because the controls on

11 9. See Alan Boyd, Th ai Regulators Target Small Investors with Mutu al Fun d Reforms, Bus .
TI MES, July 20, 1993, at 10; Bill Rumbler, Fidelity's 'Slopiness 'Stirs Call fo r Change, CHI. SUN-T IMES,
June 24, 1994, at 45 .
120. Ippolito, sup ra note 106, at 67.
121. W illiam Smart, Th e Greening of America, Part JJ, WASH. PosT, July 5, 198 4, at B5.
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stealing are necessarily imperfect. Despite the existence of laws against
embezzlement and no matter how good the past performance, a rational
investor would not invest with a thief, because past performance will, in
such cases, be an insufficient guide to future performance.
To the extent that investors care about the trading policies of specific
funds as a proxy for managerial honesty, the funds have an incentive to
respond, and can respond adequately. But the core concern of those worried
about personal trading is at the systemic level, potentially beyond the reach
of individual fund action. The concern is that unsophisticated investors will
consider themselves unable to distinguish between honest and dishonest
funds, i.e., funds with credible ethical codes and those without. Thus,
distrusting the industry as a whole, the investor will move their money to
alternate forms of investments.
On this construction, the market integrity worry is a problem of
asymmetrical information and costly signaling. 122 Specifically, the market
integrity argument is a claim that asymmetric information regarding the
personal trading policies and practices of fund advisors, and the fund
advisors inability to distinguish themselves, threaten to drive investors from
the industry.
Whether there is, in fact, a threat that consumers will lose confidence in
the integrity of the mutual fund market is, of course, an empirical claim.
Like many empirical assumptions underlying policy making, there is
precious little evidence on whether or not it is correct. What evidence exists
is mixed and utterly inconclusive. The American Association of Individual
Investors said shortly after the Kaweske scandal broke that it had not been
receiving comments regarding the ethics of the fund managers, but had

122. For a comprehensive treatment of the economics of imperfect information, see Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Imperfect Information in the Product Market, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
769 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
The market integrity worry is thus similar to but different from the famous "lemons" market. In
Akerlofs classic analysis of the used car market, George Akerl of, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 ( 1970), the inability of consumers to
distingui sh between good and bad used cars leads consumers to offer no more for good used cars than
for bad. Such an outcome is inefficient as consumers would be w illing to pay more for a good used car,
and sellers of good used cars would very much like to recei ve more for their cars. !d. at 4 89. This will
not occur without a credible mechanism for distinguishing the good cars from the lemons. !d. at 499.
As Ippolito exp lains, the mutual fund market differs critically from a "lemons" market because there
is public information on past performance, and past performance is correlated to some extent with future
performance, precisely what is missing in the used car market. Ippol ito, supra note 106, at 56-66.
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heard complaints from Invesco investors furious that Kaweske was
fired. 123 Jack Bowers, editor of Fidelity Monitor, a newsletter that tracks
Fidelity funds, received 100 calls in three days from investors worried
about the impact of the drop in the Hong Kong stock market but only one
call on the trading issue. 124 At the same time, there were numerous
newspaper articles and editorials condemning personal trading . The
Washington Post printed several prominent articles which could be
expected to have a disproportionate impact "inside the beltway." 125
Moreover, the fact that there was no present indication of a problem does
not mean that confidence was not being eroded and, similarly, by the time
there is evidence of erosion, it may be too late to do anything about it. I
will therefore assume that there is substantial reason to worry that the
controversy over personal trading poses a threat to the mutual fund
industry.
What, then, are the appropriate regulatory responses? Markets routinely
respond to potential problems arising from consumers' inability to observe
product quality directly and before purchase in markets with imperfect
information. Common mechanisms include the seller's interest in preserving
its reputation, and other types of"bonds," disclosures, certifications by third
party information specialists, and guarantees. 126 Before considering
whether the SEC has a role to play, one needs first to focus on the likely
market responses to actual or threatened erosion of investor confidence in
the mutual fund industry.
A firm's desire to preserve its reputation as a trustworthy custodian of
investor funds is likely to provide a strong incentive for the firm to adopt
standards of behavior for fund managers that both protect investors and are
perceived to protect investors. One method a firm might adopt would be to
disclose its policies on personal trading. Disclosure, alone, is generally not
sufficient to solve an asymmetrical information problem because both good
and bad firms would have an incentive to pretend to be good firms. Rather,
the disclosures must be credible. Under the general disclosure rules of the

James M . Pethokouki s, Controversy Has Yet To Sully Funds· Image, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY,
1994 , at l . •
Bailey & Zitner, supra note 19, at A l.
See. e.g., Fromson, supra note 13; Stan Hinden, Avoiding Conflicts- Real and Perceived;
Mutual Fund Managers Sh ouldn't Make Trades, If Only Because It Looks Bad, W ASH. POST, May 22,
!994, at H 3.
126. Sti g litz, supra note 122. For a prel iminary di scuss ion of bonding by fund s, see Ippo lito, supra
note l 06, at 66-67 .
123.
Mar. 4,
124.
125.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .?. . . . . . .
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secunt1es laws 127 a fund adviser who has a bad ethics code but falsely
claims to have a good code in order to induce investors to purchase shares
of the fund violates section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, as well as section 17 of
the ICA and section 206 of the IAA. Because of the prohibitions against
and potential liability for misleading disclosures, securities disclosures have
greater inherent credibility than other sorts.
But suppose consumers were too unsophisticated to read and understand
the differences between different trading policies? An alternative approach
would be for funds to adhere to (and to announce their adherence to) a
"Code of Best Practices." One saw this sort of response by publicly traded
firms in response to criticism over investment policies in South Africa
when firms announced their adherence to the "Sullivan Principles." 128 The
analogue for the mutual fund industry might be a "Code of Best Practices"
prepared by the ICI. But note the importance of adopting a code that really
does represent the "best practices": Once a code becomes widespread, firms
may feel an obligation to adopt it, whether or not it is optimal or even
useful. 129 Moreover, when a trade group adopts a code of best practices
under pressure from regulators (and in order to preempt regulation), its
voluntary nature is further eroded.
Another approach that typically emerges when imperfect information is
a problem is the independent information specialist. With respect to
consumer goods, Consumer Reports plays this role. With respect to publicly
held companies, audits provide a similar assurance. To the extent that
personal trading undermines the industry, one would expect the emergence
of a similar sort of certification in the securities markets.
But waiting for a market response to the personal trading controversy
might be viewed as inadequate, either because of the possibility that the
market may react too slowly, with insufficient seriousness, or because of
political pressure to act. If regulators feel compelled to act, either directly
or through putting pressure on funds to adopt ICI recommendations, in
what direction should they focus their energies?
To the extent that the market integrity argument is a claim about
asymmetric information and costly signalling-my best reconstruction of

127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a-78ll (1 994).
128. Peter Behr, Can U.S. Firms Do Well Abroad and Do Good? Clinton Teams Seek Ethical
Business Codes, WASH. POST, July 8, 1994, at F I.
129. In this regard , e thics codes may exhibit both pos iti ve and negati ve network externalities. See
Michae l Kl ausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Netwo rks of Contracts, 8 1 VA. L. RE v. 757
( 1995).
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the argument-a narrowly tailored regulatory response would seek to
ameliorate these inadequacies. Thus, one strategy for preventing or
overcoming an asymmetric information problem would be to focus on
improving the quality, quantity, and comparability of the information
available to the market. In particular, the SEC might require funds to return
to the prior requirement (apparently eliminated in a paperwork reduction
move) that fund advisors file their ethics codes as an attachment to their
annual disclosure forms, or require a summary of personal trading policies,
either in the prospectus itself or in their Statements of Additional
Information. 130 This would be a direct response to the problem of
asymmetric information that lies behind the (assumed) market integrity
worry.
But, some might argue, this still misunderstands the nature of the
problem: Even with full disclosure, investors in the mutual fund industry
are unsophisticated and will be unable to understand and distinguish
between honest and dishonest funds. This argument is problematic. First,
it ignores the extent to which the mutual fund market behaves as if
consumers were vigilant with respect to the quality of investment
performance. 131 A second and related point is that the argument ignores
the extent to which shoppers (sophisticated investors) protect non-shoppers
(unsophisticated investors). 132 In markets without price discrimination,
such as securities markets, competition for even a relatively small number
of marginal buyers (shoppers) will protect non-shoppers. Even if the
ordinary investor does not read the disclosure material, so long as informed
and active traders incorporate the information, such investors will be
protected.
But suppose that one concluded that the nature of the mutual fund
industry is sufficiently distinct from other product markets 133 that normal
market responses to information asymmetry combined with credible

130. IC I REPORT, supra note 16, at 49 (recommendation 5); SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 33
(recommendation I).
131. See Ippolito, supra note I 06.
132. Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 V A. L. REv. 1387 ( 1983) (h ere inafter Imperfect
Information] (arguing that competitio n for shoppers protects non- shoppers of warranty and security
interests due to the absence of an ability to price discriminate); Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 630, 638 ( 1979) (hereinafter Intervening in Markets] (arguing that competition among firm s
for shoppers may protect non-shoppers, at least in the absence of an ability to price discriminate).
133. This distinction may ari se because of particularly unsophi sticated consumers or because the
product is but a collection of abs trac t legal rights, depriving consumers of a tire to kick.
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mandatory disclosure are inadequate? Here we reach the critical weakness
in regulatory strategy: Any additional regulatory intervention will
necessarily be ad hoc, seeking to reassure investors through alternative
strategies. The underlying asymmetrical information problem does not
provide a theory of regulation beyond that designed to remedy the
underlying asymmetry of information or costliness of signalling. The
dangers of wider regulatory intervention increase because steps taken in the
expectation of reassuring investors (whose nervousness is largely conjectural) may in fact hurt investors by limiting the ability of funds to adopt
optimal approaches. As the discussion of the recommendations of the ICI
Advisory Committee and the SEC's Division of Investment Management
will show, the ICI and SEC have taken each of these approaches.
IV.

THE

ICI

RECOMM ENDATIONS

In response to the personal trading controversy, and the resulting pressure
for action by the SEC and Congress, the Investment Company Institute
formed an advisory committee to survey current personal trading practices
and to formulate recommendations. 134 Relying on the preceding analysis,
I now turn to these recommendations.
The Advisory Committee's recommendations can be divided into four
categories. First, it recommended that every investment company include
in its code of ethics a statement of "general fiduciary principles that govern
personal trading," including: a "duty to place the interests of investors
first;" a requirement "that all personal trading be conducted consistent with
the code of ethics and in such a manner as to avoid any actual or potential
conflicts of interest;" and a fundamental duty on employees not to take
"inappropriate advantage of their positions." 135 Second, the Advisory
Committee recommended that investment companies make more complete
disclosure regarding their trading policies. 136 Third, the recommendations
included enforcement mechanisms that largely comported with or extended
current practice. 137 Finally, the Advisory Committee recommended

!34. The advisory committee was composed of Charles A. Fiumefreddo, Chairman and CEO of
Dean Witter Intercapital Inc ., Jon S. Fosse!, Chairman and CEO of Oppenheimer Management Group,
Robert H. Graham, President, AIM Advisors, Inc., Ronald P. Lynch, Managing Partner, Lord, Abbett
& Co. , Robert C. Pozen, Managing Director and General Counsel, FMR Corporation, and James S.
Riepe, Managing Director, T. Rowe Price Associates. ICI REPORT, supra note 16, app. IV.
135. /d.at2 7.
136. !d. at 29.
137. !d. at 42-49.
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substantive restrictions on personal trading activities that went beyond what
was currently mandated by general securities law, the Investment Company
Act, the Investment Advisers Act, as well as the prevailing industry
practices. 138
One can approach these recommendations from three perspectives: as
management recommendations; as a proposed Code of Best Practices which
firms can adopt if they find them useful or if they find it necessary to
reassure investors; or as proposed mandatory rules. If viewed as management recommendations, the question is whether these proposals are a
sensible way of managing the conflicts of interest faced by access persons
in personal trading. To the extent that the proposals are, in fact, mere
recommendations which funds are free to adopt or reject, the funds
themselves will make this judgment.
More interesting are the questions whether these proposals make sense
as an optional Code of Best Practices or as mandatory rules. 139 Because
of the tendency of optional Codes of Best Practice to become, in effect,
mandatory terms, it makes the most sense to consider whether the ICI
proposals would be appropriate recommendations for mandatory rules. 140
To the extent that the ICI's proposals are viewed as proposals for rule
making, a striking feature is the extent to which they go beyond correcting
any underlying information asymmetry.
From this perspective, only the enhanced disclosure requirements are
directly responsive to the information asymmetry. The first proposal- the
general statement of fiduciary principles-is more aspirational than
regulatory. The remaining proposals--on enforcement and substance--can
be viewed as representing two escalating levels of intervention. The more
modest of the proposals are the recommendations on enforcement
mechanisms which are both consistent with the underlying regulatory
structure and current practice, and so raise few significant questions . More
interesting, and more controversial, are the substantive proposals which go
well beyond, and directly against, the state of the art. It is to these specific
proposals that I now tum.

138. !d. at 31.
139. There is a conti nuum between optional and mandatory, ranging from SEC rulemaking to
adoption by funds in order to forestall SEC rulemaking, to adoption by funds out of pressure to
conform, or to adoption by funds because they are perceived to be useful, either as a signalling device
or as a management approach.
140. The SEC has broad power to issue rules of this sort under§ 17U). See 15 U.S.C. § 78(w)
(1994) .
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Enforcement Recommendations

In its report, the Advisory Committee recommended that all "codes of
ethics require all access persons to 'preclear' personal securities investments."141 In addition, the Advisory Committee recommended that codes
of ethics require direct notification of access person's trades by brokers to
the appropriate compliance personnel, duplicate confirmations, and copies
of periodic statements for all accounts. 142 The Advisory Committee
further proposed that the National Association of Securities Dealers adopt
a rule requiring broker-dealers to notify a registered investment adviser
when any of its employees opens a brokerage account. 143 Finally, the
Advisory Committee recommended that each investment company
implement procedures to ensure post-trade monitoring, disclosure of
personal holdings, and annual certification of compliance with codes of
ethics. 144
As the earlier summary of the ICI survey results indicated, these
recommendations do not go substantially beyond current practice. 145 The
core recommendation, namely, preclearance of all trades, while not
currently required by rule 17j-l, is nonetheless universally utilized. 146 The
other enforcement recommendations supplement preclearance to ensure that
codes of ethics are enforced.
The thrust of these recommendations is to increase public confidence by
reassuring investors that firms are enforcing their ethics codes. Such steps
are consistent with the distinctive underlying structure of the mutual fund
regulation: the forcing of explicit contracts, and the enforcement of those
contracts, without specifying the terms of such contracts. To the extent that
the regulatory strategy depends on firms enforcing their explicit contracts,
mandating the adoption of the state of the art enforcement mechanisms is
consistent. Moreover, because the recommendations largely track current
practice, and, to the extent that they do not, have a limited effect on
management discretion or legal trading activities by access persons, they
are relatively uncontroversial. Whether they will, in fact, bolster public
confidence remains to be seen.

141.
142.
143.
!44.
145.
146.

IC! REPORT, supra note 16, at 42.
!d. at 44.
ld. at 44.
!d. at 45.
See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
!Cl REPORT, supra note 16, app. II, at 3.
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Substantive Recommendations

The Advisory Committee, however, went beyond recommendations that
directly respond to the potential asymmetry of information such as the
recommendation for increased disclosure, and beyond confidence building
measures such as improved enforcement mechanisms. In addition, the
Advisory Committee's report contained recommendations for changes to the
substantive content of codes of ethics. These changes go well beyond
current law and practice. Specifically, the ICI recommended: prohibition of
investments in IPOs; restrictions on investments in private placements;
blackout periods; a ban on short term trading; and limitations on serving as
a director of portfolio companies. 147 I consider each in turn.

1. Initial Public Offerings
The ICI report recommended that "codes of ethics flatly prohibit
investment personnel from acquiring any securities in an initial public
offering, in order to preclude any possibility of their profiting improperly
from their positions on behalf of an investment company." 148 As the
report describes, purchase of IPOs pose two conflicts of interest. First,
because the opportunity to participate in a "hot" issue is valuable, it raises
the question whether it is a fund opportunity or a personal opportunity.
Second, the opportunity to participate in a public offering "may create the
impression that future investment decisions for the investment company
were not pursued solely because they were in the best interests of the
fund's shareholders." 149 That is, the opportunity may be, or may be
perceived to be, a bribe.
To the extent that an opportunity to purchase an IPO constitutes a form
of payment in exchange for the fund manager purchasing other securities,
it is already prohibited by section 17(e)(l), as discussed above. 150 To the
extent that the problem is that the opportunity to invest in the IPO is a
valuable corporate opportunity, when a fund manager diverts the opportunity to invest to his or her own benefit, it is but a special case of the more
general duty of loyalty. This duty is normally analyzed under the rubric of

147.
148.
149.
150.

!d. at 31-42.
ld.at31.
!d. at 32.
See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text .
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"diversion of corporate opportunity." 151
Corporate law has developed a variety of tests for distinguishing between
corporate and personal investment opportunities. However, no per se rule
has been adopted, which makes any particular category of investment off
limits. 152 Even at the director level, corporate law generally permits
disinterested directors to adopt standards for the firm that permit specified
recurring types of transactions to be approved in advance, which otherwise
might be deemed "corporate opportunities." 153 Below the senior executive
level, corporate law has left the problem entirely to individual firms.
The question, then, becomes whether investing in IPOs is somehow so
different from other potential corporate opportunities that a mandatory
prohibition on all access persons is appropriate. The fact that only twentyfive of ninety-six fund complexes currently forbid or restrict such
investments is substantial evidence that, as a management matter, the
potential for harm to the fund is not such that a mandatory prohibition is
required.
Moreover, one can easily imagine situations in which the investment in
an IPO is a perfectly legitimate investment. Suppose, for example, that the
manager of an S & P 500 index fund seeks to invest in the IPO of a small
biotech company. In such cases, the opportunity is clearly not an opportunity of the manager's fund, which is limited to investing in the S & P 500.
Similarly, it is likely not a bribe, given the manager' s limited investment
discretion. As a management matter, one might still consider such an
investment opportunity to be an opportunity of the fund complex more
generally. In such cases, a fund could adopt a rule like Fidelity's requiring
access personnel to offer all "investable" ideas to the funds before
investing.
The recommendation for a per se prohibition on investments in IPOs
rests, at base, on one of two arguments. First, it may be a sensible political
response, independent of whether it is good for funds or shareholders.
When, as here, the chairman of the SEC expresses the view that, "were he
an investment company director, he 'would have reservations about trading
by managers and would be greatly troubled by their buying and selling

151. For a good di scussion of the corporate opportunity doctrine, see ROBERT CLARK, CoRPORATE
223-62 (1986).
152. !d.
153 . AM ERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANC E: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.09, discussed in John Coffee, Jr. , The Mandatory-Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:
An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 16 18, 1670 & n.215 ( 1989).
L AW
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IPOs,'" 154 banning investments in IPOs may be the better part of valor.
But that sensible political response, perhaps necessary to fend off more
damaging regulation, should not be confused with a principled regulatory
argument.
Second, the recommendation may rest on a claim that participating in a
"hot issue" may "create the impression that future investment decisions for
the company were not pursued solely because they were in the interests of
the fund's shareholders." 155 This argument, is, at heart, an asymmetry of
information argument. Like other such arguments, it primarily justifies an
information forcing response, namely, the requirement that funds disclose
their policies on investments in IPOs in a standardized and comparable
form. Without providing evidence that investment in IPOs is undermining
confidence in mutual funds, or that a disclosure requirement would not
suffice to redress whatever threat to confidence exists, or that prohibiting
investments in IPOs will increase confidence, the proposal is unpersuasive.
2. Private Placements

The ICI Advisory Committee also recommended restnctmg the
investment in private placements by requiring prior approval (taking into
account whether the opportunity is a fund opportunity), future disclosure
when the manager takes part in an investment decision that affects the
investment, and independent review of any such investment decision. 156
Private placements pose a conflict of interest because a fund manager may
be given the opportunity to participate in the hopes that down the line he
or she will induce the fund to participate in a subsequent IPO, which will
increase the value of the manager's earlier investment. The Advisory
Committee does not recommend prohibiting such investments entirely- in
parallel with investments in IPOs-because "many, if not most, private
placements will not raise any potential conflict of interest." 157 A complete
ban may solve the conflict but would also restrict many legitimate
investment opportunities.
The analysis here follows the analysis of the prohibition on investment
in IPOs. As a management recommendation, it departs substantially from
current practice. Of the ninety-six funds surveyed, only seven restricted

154. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Mutual Funds and Investment Management
Conference (Mar. 21, 1994), cited and quoted in lCl REPORT, supra note 16, at 32 n.64.
155. ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at 32.
156. !d. at 33 .
157. !d. at 34.
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private placements. 158 As a political response, it is understandable:
Commissioner Roberts noted that he is troubled by "recent press accounts
which depict fund managers as receiving free or deeply discounted stock
and options in companies prior to fund investment in that company . . .. At
a minimum, this type of conduct is troublesome, particularly in an IPO
situation." 159 As a principled regulatory response, the recommendation,
like the recommendation on IPO investments, is unsupported.

3. Blackout Periods
The Advisory Committee also recommended that codes of ethics prohibit
all access persons from trading on the day during which any fund in the
investment complex has a buy or sell order pending, up until the order is
executed or withdrawn. 160 In addition, the Advisory Committee recommends that portfolio managers be prohibited from buying or selling a
security within at least seven days before or after their investment
company. 16 1 Any trading profits would be disgorged to the fund. While
sixty-three of the ninety-six complexes impose blackout periods, they vary
in the terms and duration. 162
The stated justification for blackout periods was that they are necessary
to ensure that access persons are not taking advantage of the market effect
of fund purchases or sales. As such, the recommendation was designed to
improve the enforcement of already existing bans on frontrunning. 163 But,
by making it more difficult for access persons to gain any benefit from the
market effect of fund trading (whether or not it hurts the fund investors),
it made operational the general commitment to putting the interests of the
shareholders ahead of the personal interests of the access persons. A
blackout period may thus serve as a symbolic commitment that the
investment decisions of the funds will be utterly independent of the
personal investment decisions of access persons.
At the same time, of course, blackout provisions are overly broad,
preventing harmless trading by access persons. Although the prohibition on
trading by all access persons before any fund in the complex executes or

158. !d. app. II, at 3.
159. Richard J. Roberts, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks at the D.C. Bar and George Washington
Univ. Merging Financial Markets Conference (Mar. 25, 1994), quoted in JCI REPORT, supra note 16,
at 34 n.66.
160. ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at 35 .
161. !d.
162. !d. at 36.
163. !d. at 36.
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withdraws a "buy" or "sell" order imposes little inconvenience, the seven
day prohibition on trades by portfolio managers before or after a trade by
the manager's fund imposes a more significant restriction. A portfolio
manager might complain, for example, that even a very small trade by the
fund in a large capitalization company will block personal trades for a two
week period, despite the fact that the fund's trade will have no market
impact.
As the Advisory Committee pointed out, blackout periods are common,
with sixty-three of the ninety-six fund complexes surveyed using some
form of blackout period. 164 But, the Committee noted, "there is little
uniformity in the duration of blackout periods presently applied-the time
periods vary from two to thirty days." 165 The Advisory Committee took
this lack of uniformity to be a justification for a uniform recommendation.
But should it be? Should one be concerned that blackout periods vary, or
that a third of the funds do not use them?
If the blackout periods are largely a mechanism for ensuring that
portfolio managers do not benefit from the market impact of fund trading
to the detriment of fund investors, then one would expect that the length
would vary from firm to firm, depending on the nature of the enforcement
problems. Moreover, one should be untroubled by such diversity. If, on the
other hand, a prime value of blackout periods is their symbolic reassurance
that portfolio managers' trading decisions are unaffected by front running,
and, if we assume that investors will not be able to distinguish between
firms with good and bad blackout policies, then a uniform standard may be
important. On this analysis, blackout periods, like preclearance, are
important mechanisms for enforcing the ban on front running and other
variants, and uniformity is valuable for building investor confidence.
4. Ban on Short- Term Trading Profits
The Advisory Committee's most controversial proposal was its
recommendation that "codes of ethics prohibit all investment personnel
from profiting in the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the same
(or equivalent) securities within 60 calendar days." 166 This proposal
departed dramatically from current practice: only four of ninety-six funds

164. JCI REPORT, supra note 16, at 36.
165. Jd.
166. Jd. at 37.
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surveyed prohibited such trading. 167 The stated justification was that such
a prohibition "can serve as an important prophylactic device against
potential frontrunning transactions." 168 The Committee itself recognized
that, as a response to frontrunning, the recommendation could be viewed
as "overkill." Indeed, the proposal-which all but eliminates options trading
and short selling 169-holds the greatest potential for driving money
managers to less regulated collective investment vehicles.
Why is it that so few investment companies currently prohibit short term
trading? Here, the arguments made above in connection with personal
trading generally re-enter. On the one hand, short term trading is potentially
a problem because it can distract an access person from his or her job. In
addition, it is one method by which access persons can capitalize on the
market effect of fund trading.
On the other hand, firms have good incentives to adopt an optimal policy
on short term trading. If, in fact, it is unduly distracting, a firm can prohibit
it or fire the access person who is spending all day on the phone with his
or her broker. At the same time, some of the people whom a fund most
wants to hire are going to be avid traders. If funds individually or
collectively ban short term trading, these traders may well choose one of
the less regulated alternatives.
The arguments against a ban on short term trading thus parallel the
arguments that the Advisory Committee itself made in rejecting the
suggestion that all personal trading be banned. 170 What, then, is the
attraction of such a policy, and why would the Advisory Committee's
recommendation for enhanced disclosure not suffice? One explanation for
the recommendation, like the explanations for other substantive recommendations, may be political: Congress and others periodically condemn short
term trading as "speculative." As such, the recommendation has the virtue
of being politically wholesome, even if it proves harmful to mutual fund
investors by driving away some of the best stock pickers.

5. Access Persons Serving as Directors
Finally, the Advisory Group recommended that "codes of ethics prohibit
investment personnel from serving on the boards of directors of publicly

167. Of these four, two impose a 30-day holding period, one a 60-day holding period and one a
91-day holding period. !d. at 38.
168. ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at 37-38.
169. !d. at 39 n.72.
170. !d. at 19-25.

1995]

FOXES AND HEN HOUSES?

1635

traded companies, absent prior authorization based upon a determination
that the board service would be consistent with the interests of the
investment company and its shareholders." 171 While a recommendation
that access persons not serve as directors absent advance approval by the
fund is unexceptional, what is most striking about the recommendation
(which, of course, has nothing to do with personal trading) is what it
reflects about the industry 's attitudes towards involvement in the governance of portfolio companies. Although mutual funds are among the
biggest shareholders, the industry clearly does not believe that involvement
in portfolio companies pays, or that it pays sufficiently well to forego any
liquidity. This is reflected in the Advisory Committee's comment that "(i]n
the relatively small number of instances in which board service is
authorized," a Chinese Wall procedure should be used to shield directors
from investment decisions. 172 This view should stand as a warning of the
magnitude of the task of those who would cast mutual funds as "relational
investors" who might provide continuous and textured monitoring through
a position on the board.

C.

Conclusion

As described above, the Advisory Committee goes substantially beyond
attempting to redress the information asymmetry that lies at the heart of the
concern with market integrity. One lesson that emerges from the analysis
is that once one moves beyond measures designed to improve disclosure to
non-disclosure based measures that may be thought to increase consumer
confidence directly, the scope for responding to political pressures increases
substantially. The Advisory Committee's recommendations to ban
investment in IPOs, to limit investments in private placements, and to
prohibit short term trading are perhaps best explained as responses to such
pressure.
V.

THE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Several months after the ICI commission's report and recommendations,
the SEC's Division of Investment Management issued its own report and
recommendations. 173 Following a review of thirty fund groups employing

171. Id. at 40.
172. Id.
173 . SEC REPORT, sup ra note 17.
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622 fund managers who, in aggregate, managed 1,053 funds with total
assets of $521 billion, the Division concluded that fund managers generally
did not invest extensively for their personal accounts and that potential
conflicts of interest were few. 174 Taken as a whole, the Division concluded that the data collected suggested "that the existing regulatory framework
governing the personal investment activities of fund personnel has generally
worked well, but can be improved. The data, in any event, does not reveal
abusive trading patterns that the Division believes could only be remedied
by a total prohibition on personal trading by fund personnel." 175
Given the media attention to personal trading, the data collected by the
Division on trading patterns is striking: in 1993, 43.5% of the fund
managers in the sample did not trade at all and 75% had ten or fewer
transactions. 176 A few managers associated with fund groups selected on
the basis of staff experience that indicated active trading by managers,
accounted for the large majority of trades and the large majority of
matching trades. 177 In all but a very few cases of matching trades, the
funds received better prices than the managers, 178 with the fund manager
receiving a better price in only about one percent of the transactions. 179
The SEC Report, like the ICI Report, rejected a per se ban on personal
trading. First, the Division raised some doubts about the SEC's authority
to ban personal trading, and pointed out that the language and legislative
history of section 17(j) does not contemplate a complete ban, but, rather,
recommends regulation. 180 Second, in the absence of any evidence of
widespread abuse, the Division did not believe that the "potential harm to
fund shareholders resulting from the practice [was] so great as to be
contrary to the public interest." 181
In place of a ban on personal trading, the Division made two types of
recommendations. First, although the Division did not recommend the
adoption of the ICI recommendations as SEC rules, it gestured in that
direction:

174. !d. at 18.
175. !d. at 2.
176. !d. at 18.
177. Matching trades are "defined to include any personal transaction that preceded by ten days or
less a transacti on by a related fund on the same side of the market (i. e. , buy/buy or sell/sell) in the same
or rel ated securities." SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 18.
178. !d. at 24.
179. !d.
180. !d. at 27-28 . See also supra note 177 and accompanying text.
181. SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 28.
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[T]he Division believes that the management and board of directors or
trustees of each fund should specifically consider the recommendations in the
ICI Report. Moreover, the Division would expect all funds to adopt the
Report's recommendations, in whole or substantial part, absent special
circumstances. 182

In case anyone did not get the message, the Division went on:
[The Division] request[s] a report from the ICI within the next six months
describing, among other things, the number of ICI members that have
adopted the recommendations and any interpretive, administrative, or other
problems ICI members have experienced in implementing the recommendations. On the basis of that report, the Division may reconsider the issue of
amending rule 17j-l to provide for uniform code of ethics standards. 183

Second, the Division made several specific recommendations including:
disclosure by funds of personal investing policies; enhanced board review;
disclosure of pre-employment holdings of fund employees; a National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") rule requiring that brokers
notify funds whenever a fund employee opens a brokerage account and, at
the request of the fund or adviser, that brokers provide duplicate copies of
confirmations and account statements; a ban on participation of access
personnel in "hot issue" public offerings; and clarification that section 17(j)
applies to financial instruments other than securities such as futures and
commodities. 184
With one exception, the Division' s recommendations fall comfortably
within the two types of regulations that can be justified by the underlying
asymmetry of information that gives rise to the market integrity worry. 185
With respect to disclosure, the Division recommended that funds be
required to disclose personal investing policies briefly in the prospectus and
to describe the manner in which an investor can obtain a copy of the fund's
code of ethics. 186 In addition, the Division recommended that the SEC
require funds to attach a copy of their code of ethics as an exhibit to the
registration statement, in effect returning to the prior practice, 187 and

182. ld.at32.
183. !d.
184. !d. at 33-37.
185 . The Division's recommend ations are substantially more mod est than the ICI recomm endati ons,
but must be considered aga inst the strong pressure on fund s to adopt those recommend ati ons
"voluntarily ." Compare id. with ICI REPORT, supra note 16, at 26-50.
186. SEC REPO RT, supra note 17, at 33 .
187. !d .
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thereby making ethics codes generally available. This enhanced disclosure
would address the asymmetry of infom1ation directly, by including the
substance of policies in the prospectus, and indirectly, by making available
information that third parties (the press, analysts, academics) could digest
and publicize.
The Division's recommendations regarding the disclosure to funds of
employees' pre-employment holdings 188 and its recommendation that the
NASD adopt a rule requiring brokers to notify funds directly of brokerage
activity by fund employees 189 both relate to sharpening the "enforcement
technology" available to funds. As with the ICI's recommendations
regarding preclearance of trades, these recommendations do not go to the
substance of a funds' personal trading policy, but, rather, can be expected
to increase investor confidence by making the enforcement of fund policies
more effective. Although the recommendation goes beyond current practices
(only one of the funds' studied by the SEC required new employees to
disclose securities holdings), it was calculated to sharpen the funds' ability
to enforce their ethics codes without dictating substantive norms.
The Division's recommendation of enhanced board review, according to
which the Division proposed to amend rule 17j-1 to require <:m annual
review of codes of ethics by the board, can likewise be viewed, in part, as
an attempt to make the enforcement of ethics codes more effective.
Consistent with this goal is the recommendation that the board examine
"whether both the fund and its adviser (and any subadvisers) have adopted
appropriate measures designed to prevent and detect abusive investment
practices and whether they have instituted effective compliance procedures."190 At the same time, the Division's recommendation can be
viewed as an attempt, like the ethics codes themselves, to force funds to
choose a personal trading policy explicitly. Thus, the Division recommended that, in the first instance, the board should determine "whether personal
investing is consistent with the interests of the fund's shareholders and
should be permitted." 191
The one Division recommendation that goes beyond the scope of the

188. SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 35. The Division's recommendation on the disclosure of preemployment holdings advises "that rule 17j-l be amended to require each access person of a fund to
di sclose his personal sec uriti es holdings at the time at which the access person is first employed by the
fund or its investment advi ser. " !d. As the Division points out, a fund cannot police conflicts of interest
without knowing the composition of employees' personal investment portfolios. !d.
189. !d. at 35.
190. !d. at 34.
191. !d.
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underlying regulatory justification is the recommended ban on participating
in "hot issue" public offerings. While the ICI recommended a total ban on
purchases of IPOs , the Division, concerned that the SEC's authority under
section 17(j) may not be sufficiently broad, recommended that the NASD
consider extending the existing ban on sales of hot issues to broker-dealer
employees to "personnel of investment companies, investment advisory
firms, banks, savings and loans, and insurance companies who have
authority to direct business to NASD members." 192 This recommendation,
like the ICI's broader recommendation, goes beyond disclosure and
enforcement technology to attempt to address directly an "appearance of
impropriety." As such, it is an ad hoc attempt to bolster investor confidence. Here, as in the ICI's report, the best explanation for the recommendation may be the fact that, as the Division's report notes, "Chairman
Levitt ... [has] expressed concern that participation by access persons in
IPOs, especially 'hot issue' IPOs, creates the potential for troublesome
conflicts of interest." 193
The SEC's Report, in combination with the ICI Advisory Committee
report, seems to have had several effects. First, the mutual fund industry
seems to have fallen in line. According to the follow up report that the
Division oflnvestment Management requested from the ICI, an overwhelming majority of ICI members have adopted or adapted some or all of the
recommendations, as summarized in Table 1. 194
COMPLEXES

COMPLEXES

RECOMMENDATION

ADOPTING

ASSETS

General
Principles

82%

88%

6%

IPOs

72

64

14

30

Private
Placements

69

70

14

26

ADAPTING

ASSETS

8%

!92. SEC REPORT, supra note l7, at 36.
!93. !d. at 36 (citation omitted).
!94. INVESTMENT CO. INST., REPORT TO THE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INSTITUTE'S RECOMMENDATIONS
ON PERSONAL INVESTING (Apr. 2!, !995).

1640

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 73:1601

RECOMMENDATION

COMPLEXES
ADOPTING

ASSETS

COMPLEXES
ADAPTING

ASSETS

Blackout
periods

53

47

35

48

Ban on Short
Term Trading

47

65

23

29

Service as
Director

66

72

16

23

Preclearance

69

81

14

14

Record keeping

70

83

14

12

Post Trade
Monitoring

84

90

16

10

Disclosure of
Personal Holdings

66

80

11

12

Note that with respect to the most controversial of the recommendations,
the ban on short term trading, it has only been adopted by forty-seven
percent of the member complexes, which hold sixty-five percent of the
assets . 195 An additional twenty-three percent of the complexes with twentynine percent of the assets stated that they adapted the ban to their particular
circumstances, with some adopting a more stringent version. 196 In view
of the uneven distribution of trading activity by access personnel found in
the SEC Report, this suggests that the proposal has so far been adopted
largely by those funds in which little trading occurs. This is consistent with
the informal impression of people in the industry. Second, Congress seems
satisfied and has moved on to other issues. Finally, the media has likewise
found other things to worry about.
CONCLUSION : LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

The personal trading controversy presents a classic event in securities

195. !d. at 21.
19 6. !d.

____..___________________________
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regulation. A practice emerges which captures public attention, at least
briefly. Arguments for and against the practice are made. For a complex
variety of political and economic reasons, the regulators feel an imperative
to act and the industry feels an imperative to take preemptive action. The
pro-regulatory forces suggest that the practice at issue threatens investor
confidence and the integrity of the capital markets. The anti-regulatory
forces argue that the market can provide any necessary corrections. This
constellation of forces repeats itself: insider trading; personal trading; and
the use of financial derivatives, to name just a few of the more recent
examples.
The personal trading controversy points to several critical features that
apply more generally. First, this controversy, like many others of its type,
is not primarily about fund performance. To the extent that one worries
about the impact of personal trading by fund managers on the performance
of their funds, product markets that are as competitive as the market for
mutual funds and money management services provide firms with strong
incentives to adopt optimal personal trading policies. Thus, the controversy
is about "market integrity" and "investor confidence".
This leads to the second important lesson that we can draw from the
controversy. The foregoing analysis of the controversy sharpens our
understanding of the nature of the "market integrity/investor confidence"
argument. At its heart, it is a claim about asymmetric information and
costly signalling. Equally important, this analysis provides a principled
basis for regulatory intervention as well as principled limits on that
intervention. If my analysis is correct, then the "market integrity/investor
confidence" argument may be a valid claim, depending on the facts.
However, when regulatory initiatives go beyond addressing the underlying
asymmetry of information or reducing the costs for industry participants to
signal integrity credibly and instead attempt directly to bolster "investor
confidence" by enjoining particular practices that create an appearance of
impropriety, the initiatives will be ad hoc. This imposes a greater burden
on proponents to establish that the regulations will, on balance, actually
benefit investors.
Third, the personal trading controversy provides a vivid illustration of the
interplay between media attention, congressional attention, SEC inquiry,
and pre-emptive industry self regulation. Here, the ICI's advisory
committee adopted recommendations that, if adopted, would significantly
change the substantive terms of firm trading policies. The SEC's Division
of Investment Management, while adopting narrower recommendations,
also sent a strong signal that, unless the industry "got with the program,"
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stronger stuff was on its way. In response, the industry fell in line.
Finally, the fairly unique regulatory structure in place in the mutual fund
area, in which a narrow set of mandatory rules are supplemented by a
regime of forced explicit contracting, provides a promising and important
middle ground between the regulatory and deregulatory camps and deserves
wider scrutiny and use. This is the only sort of regulatory approach that
stands a chance of working, given the incredible diversity among firms that
manage so much of our money.

